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      We explore electronic crowdfunding platforms as 
a means of receiving money and other resources by 
an entrepreneur from many parties for financing 
wearable technology project. The electronic platform 
determines the cost of funding for the entrepreneur 
and the return investors will receive per period. This 
research aims to develop a framework to understand 
and evaluate the quantitative and qualitative 
implications of various crowdfunding platforms for 
the entrepreneur and his investment decisions in 
wearable technologies. We consider a debt financing 
based platform and examine its operational 
implications on the entrepreneur’s decisions. In 
addition, we identify the incentive problems that 
occur in these models. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
      After the recent financial crises, banks have 
developed a reluctance to provide financing to 
entrepreneurs. The banks are even more reluctant to 
finance wearable technology projects due to the high 
market and technology risks associated with them. In 
order to overcome this problem, entrepreneurs are 
seeking alternative ways to obtain funding. As a 
result, crowdfunding is becoming increasingly 
popular as a means of new venture financing 
especially for high risk wearable technologies.  
      For example recently, doppel (a performance-
enhancing wearable technology) managed to 
successfully raise more than £ 110.000 from 820 
backers through crowdfunding. Similarly, PUGZ 
(world's smallest wireless earbuds charged through 
phone) has already raised $300.000 through the 
Kickstarter. As of September 2015, there are 33 
wearables projects actively raising funds on 
Kickstarter through crowdfunding. In general, 
crowdfunding is viewed as a common financing 
mechanism to finance high risk wearable technology 
projects.        
      Crowdfunding is not new; it has been the 
backbone of the American political system for a long 
time [1, 2]. According to [3], raising funds by tapping 
general public is the key element of crowdfunding. 
The idea of crowdfunding is to obtain funding from a 
large audience, where each individual provides a 
small amount, instead of raising the money from a 
very small group of sophisticated investors. 
Entrepreneurs are not only motivated to use 
crowdfunding for obtaining funding; they also use it 
for acquiring information [4]. Hence, crowdfunding 
can be employed as a way of promoting the 
company, to support user-based improvement, or as a 
way for the producer to be better informed about the 
preferences of the consumer. In that sense, it is an 
excellent tool for co-creation, in which both firms 
and active customers create value through new forms 
of interaction, service and learning mechanisms. The 
meaning of value and the process of value creation 
are rapidly shifting from a product- and firm-centric 
view to personalized consumer experiences [5]. This 
is in line with [3], who focus specifically on 
crowdfunding and state that investors do not only 
participate in crowdfunding projects because they 
have extrinsic motivations (monetary reward), but 
they also have intrinsic motivations (related to the 
pleasure or fun of doing the particular task i.e. 
investing). In this research, crowdfunding is defined 
as follows:  
      “Crowdfunding is the process of one party 
requesting and receiving money and other resources 
from many parties for financing a project, in 
exchange for a monetary or non-monetary return or 
for a charitable reason.” 
       More specifically, [1] evaluates three typical 
examples of crowdfunding to explain the concept: 
peer-to-peer micro lending websites, funding art 
(books, music, etc.) and funding starting companies. 
The first example is peer-to-peer micro lending 
websites like Kiva, where people can directly lend 
money to small businesses in the Third World. Kiva 
is a platform that uses the Internet to connect small 
businesses in the Third World with philanthropically 
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minded lenders in the First World. Second, websites 
like Sellaband and TenPages are set up to support 
upcoming artists or writers by providing funding for 
the production of an album or publication of a book. 
Third, the crowd can fund a whole company or 
project executed by an entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs 
obtain money from the crowd to fund a concrete 
project with financial needs, via websites like 
Kickstarter. 
      This research will focus on the third type of 
crowdfunding: funding new ventures. [3] consider 
crowdfunding as an interesting alternative for 
traditional financing methods like debt and equity 
financing. This research will elaborate on this 
observation. However, crowdfunding may be offered 
in a debt or equity structure itself.  
      In crowdfunding, the entrepreneur makes an open 
call for funding a new venture or other project on an 
electronic platform. The entrepreneur offers the 
investors a return on their investment, which may be 
both a monetary return and/or a non-monetary return 
(“in-kind”). He sets the return beforehand. The 
monetary return depends on the revenues of the 
venture and is constrained by a minimum of zero and 
a particular maximum value. The in-kind reward 
depends on the product or service that the 
entrepreneur offers, like a free sample of the product. 
In addition to the obligation of paying the investor a 
return, the entrepreneur is compulsory to inform the 
investor about his progression and financial 
statements.  
      The second stakeholder is the group of investors.  
In the Netherlands, the investor is by law allowed to 
invest an amount between €10 and €5,000 per 
venture, and in total not more than €40,000, allocated 
over a maximum of 100 ventures.  
      Third, the platform plays a central role.  The 
platform facilitates the crowdfunding process by 
bringing together entrepreneurs and investors and 
assisting in the conclusion of an agreement between 
investor and entrepreneur. The platform also assists 
the entrepreneur in the fulfillment of his contractual 
obligations and coordinates the cash flow from 
investor to entrepreneur via a blocked bank account.  
      The crowdfunding process can been divided in 
three phases: the pre-crowdfunding-period, the 
crowdfunding-period, and the post-crowdfunding 
period. In the pre-crowdfunding-period, the platform 
screens entrepreneurs, they both sign a contract and 
together they determine the variables that define the 
financial structure.  
      Subsequently, the crowdfunding period starts. 
During the crowdfunding phase, investors pay an 
amount between €10 and €5,000 into a third party 
account. Crowdfunding platforms typically work 
with a minimum pledge: when the entrepreneur 
attains a threshold amount, he obtains his money, 
otherwise he does not. All payments are voided 
unless a minimal amount is reached before some 
deadline. If the total amount that is paid by investors 
is smaller than the amount required by the 
entrepreneur as determined beforehand, investors 
receive their investment back, minus transaction 
costs. On the other hand, if the entrepreneur has 
collected the threshold amount, he receives the 
amount minus a success fee. As a result, he sets up 
his business and the post-crowdfunding period 
begins. Within this phase, the entrepreneur yearly 
pays a particular return to the investors, which is 
based on yearly revenues and constrained by a pre-
defined maximum.  
      Along the crowdfunding process, three important 
decision making points for the platform can be 
identified. First, the platform needs to decide which 
entrepreneurs to accept on the platform and which 
not. However, this decision is affected to a large 
extent by legal restrictions. The platform is not 
allowed to select entrepreneurs, because they are 
legally not allowed to provide investors with advice. 
However, to prevent swindlers from getting access to 
the platform, the platform has drawn up several 
objective criteria, which should be met by the 
entrepreneur. The entrepreneur should for instance be 
able to open a business bank account.  
      Second, the platform limits the crowdfunding 
period and determines the exact duration of this 
period.  
Third the platform specifies the financial structure, 
i.e., the return investors will receive per time period.  
      This research aims to develop a quantitative 
framework to understand and evaluate the 
implications of various crowdfunding models for the 
entrepreneur and investors. A detailed understanding 
of crowdfunding is crucial for designing the 
crowdfunding process in an optimal way. This 
research will mainly focus on the financial structure 
once the entrepreneur has collected his money, which 
determines the financial return to the investor. An 
optimal financial structure is essential in order to 
keep all three stakeholders involved in the long term. 
Insight in the various forms of financial models is of 
main importance for a crowdfunding platform that 
needs to choose for a particular financial model. 
Besides, this knowledge will provide the entrepreneur 
with understanding of the consequences of choosing 
a particular crowdfunding platform. 
       
2. Literature Review  
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      Crowdfunding finds its roots in crowdsourcing (1, 
6, 7] the raise of crowdsourcing explains the 
popularity of crowdfunding. Crowdsourcing is the 
general phenomenon in which firms outsource tasks 
that are traditionally performed by their employees to 
people who use their own time to complete these 
tasks. Hence, people use crowdsourcing to obtain 
ideas, feedback and solutions from the “crowd”. The 
crowd is usually but not necessarily reached through 
the Internet or social media. Jeff Howe in June 2006 
first mentioned the word “crowdsourcing” in Wired 
Magazine. He defines crowdsourcing as follows. 
      “Crowdsourcing is the act of a company or 
institution taking a job traditionally performed by a 
designated agent (usually an employee) and 
outsourcing it to an undefined, generally large group 
of people in the form of an open call.” 
      [1] states that crowdsourcing, and thus also 
crowdfunding, has emerged for four reasons. (1) As a 
result of the specialization of jobs, private individuals 
are interested in contributing to economic production 
in their spare time to do something different for a 
change or because they are willing to share their 
knowledge. (2) Dividing an overwhelming task into 
small enough chunks makes completing it not only 
feasible, but fun. See for example the open source 
software trend in the software industry (3) Increasing 
accessibility of information. (4) Emergence of online 
communities in which the online population is 
organized. The Internet allows for communication 
between amateurs and professionals. Where once 
professionals were in power, now a self-organizing 
community of amateurs takes on a large extent of the 
labor. 
      These four reasons seem to apply to 
crowdfunding as well. Concerning the second reason, 
the small chunks can be compared to the small 
amounts that investors provide individually. In 
addition, [3] state that the risk taken by investors 
might be smaller than in traditional venture financing 
methods, because a member of the crowd may 
become a consumer once the product has been 
brought to the market. Besides the investors have an 
incentive to spread the information about the product 
if they participate in the profit of the venture; they 
benefit when their network buys the product. As a 
result, crowdfunding may be used for e-marketing as 
well.  
      Other authors also endorse the importance of 
online communities. [8] show that social ties provide 
an important mechanism through which information 
asymmetry is overcome in venture finance in general. 
[9] identifies crowdfunding as an approach used to 
stream joined good will efforts of people; the option 
that community members have to invite each other 
for giving funding is an important trigger to donate. 
[10] model the importance of peer effects on the 
contributions in crowdfunding. They claim that the 
number of investors that has already invested is an 
indication of the probability of success for potential 
investors.  
      In conclusion, crowdfunding seems to be a subset 
of the more general concept of crowdsourcing. 
However, practically, crowdfunding is more difficult 
to implement because of various legal, technical and 
social complexities [6, 3]. Important legal limitations 
occur, if it involves the offering of equity to the 
crowd, because making a widespread solicitation for 
equity offering is limited to publicly listed equity. As 
a result of legal limitations, the crowdfunding 
participation is often structured in the form of making 
the participating crowd a member instead of a 
shareholder. Second, problems may be caused by 
information asymmetry, a topic that will be evaluated 
later on. Investors are not specialists and thus have 
access to less information about the industry, past 
performance of the entrepreneur and many other 
pieces of relevant information. Idea stealing may 
further be of concern, since the entrepreneur needs to 
disclose appropriate information to a wider audience 
than under traditional forms of fundraising. On the 
contrary, other information problems that exist in 
traditional venture finance are solved for 
crowdfunding.  
      Not much research has been executed on 
modeling crowdfunding in particular. However, 
attempts of modeling crowdsourcing and 
crowdfunding are discussed subsequently. Several 
models have been developed to illustrate 
crowdsourcing, both with risky return [10,11,12,13] 
and guaranteed return [14]. When comparing these 
models to crowdfunding, the risky return models 
seem to be more applicable, because the investors 
may not always get repaid their money. [10] and [11] 
have modeled crowdsourcing as an auction, but this 
does not seem to be a useful instrument because the 
return provided to investors by crowdfunding is 
unknown in advance. The return does not only 
depend on the investor’s own efforts but also on 
revenues; the efforts of the entrepreneur.  
      [10] and [11] have used game theoretic tools for 
modeling crowdsourcing. Furthermore, [6] has used 
those tools for modeling crowdfunding as well. He 
has developed a model in which interdependent 
agents operate in a dynamic, discrete setting. 
Potential investors decide whether to invest in 
passive investment, active investment, donation or 
whether they should wait for the next period. 
Moreover, he approaches the topic from investor’s 
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perspective and focuses on the process of money 
collection: earlier defined the crowdfunding period. 
      In addition, [4] identify a number of issues related 
to crowdfunding that are worth studying from an 
industrial organization perspective. Besides, they 
propose some preliminary efforts towards modeling 
crowdfunding. In their model, they associate 
crowdfunding with pre-ordering and price 
discrimination and they identify crowdfunding as an 
entrepreneur’s attempt to inform consumers of their 
product’s value. The trade-off that is explored is the 
following: with respect to external funding, 
crowdfunding has the disadvantage of delaying profit 
by one period and the advantage of offering an 
improved product to some consumers. In contrast, 
one would expect that investors invest mainly for 
receiving financial return and for the fun of being 
involved, and not especially for improving the final 
product.  
      In conclusion, there is a gap in literature in terms 
of a modeling framework to provide precise 
assessment of the post-crowdfunding period in 
particular. 
 
3. Methodology  
 
      In this chapter, the methodology and terminology 
are introduced. Several assumptions that are 
applicable to the framework are described and 
justified below. 
Assumption 1: The venture is completely financed by 
crowdfunding. 
      The venture is completely financed by debt-based 
crowdfunding: no other variants are possible. 
Besides, the entrepreneur does not have other sources 
of funding.  
Assumption 2: The fixed startup costs are zero. 
      For simplicity, fixed startup costs are normalized 
to zero. However, the results trivially extend to the 
case with fixed startup costs lager than zero.  
Assumption 3: No taxes.  
      As stated earlier, in the debt case the entrepreneur 
may have tax benefits on interest paid. Other authors, 
like [15], do consider tax benefits of debt on 
production decisions.  However, tax is not a main 
issue in this research, and including them will make it 
unnecessarily complicated.   
Assumption 4: The only variable that the 
entrepreneur can affect is the production quantity. 
      At the beginning of each period, the entrepreneur 
determines which quantity  to produce, while 
taking into account forecasted demand as market size 
 and the production costs per unit . This is the only 
decision that the entrepreneur makes in the models. 
Although in practice the entrepreneur can engage in a 
variety of activities, which generate profit and costs, 
like choices about markets, organization and 
innovation [15], those choices will not be taken into 
account.  
Assumption 5: The price of the product is assumed to 
be defined by a linear inverse demand function of the 
entrepreneur’s product [17].  
      The price of the product is defined by a linear 
inverse demand function: 
 
in which  represents the market size [17]. To 
incorporate the implications of stochastic demand in 
the model, a demand shock  is introduced in each 
period , which likewise also affects the price. The 
demand shock has a normally distributed probability 
density function , with mean  and variance , 
and cumulative distribution function . The 
demand shocks occur by the end of each time period.  
Assumption 6: The only risk that the entrepreneur 
faces is demand risk.  
      Although the entrepreneur may also experience 
technical uncertainty or market uncertainty [18], only 
demand risk is taken into account because the models 
focus on operational decisions. The other 
uncertainties are less important for the scope of this 
research. 
      We consider a two-period model and by the end 
of each period, the entrepreneur realizes revenues 
from sales. The revenues made after each period are 
described by:  
 
      As a result, subtracting the production costs from 




      This profit, however, does not take into account 
the costs of obtaining funding yet. The final profit for 
the entrepreneur is affected by those costs. The costs 
of funding differ per model, and after subtracting 
those costs, the entrepreneur makes profit . We 
aim to formulate a model that can be used to find the 
optimal production quantity  that maximizes 
expected profit for the entrepreneur. The two period 
model is solved by backwards induction. Hence, the 
second period optimal production quantity is 
determined first by solving a simple optimization 
problem. Using this information, one can determine 
what amount to produce in the first period.  
Assumption 7: The entrepreneur does not have any 
competitors.  
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      In addition, it is assumed that the entrepreneur 
holds a monopoly position in both periods. This 
seems reasonable, as the entrepreneur identifies and 
initially exploits an opportunity [18]. As a result, the 
optimal quantity to produce in the second period is 
called the monopoly quantity. However, the model 
can be extended with the occurrence of competition.  
      We build on a model developed by [19]. We start 
from their two period model with stochastic demand, 
and aim to formulate a model that can be used to find 
the optimal production quantity that maximizes 
expected profit for the entrepreneur in the debt case. 
The entrepreneur needs to make debt payments; he 
pays off the debt with a constant positive interest rate 
. He should generate a pre-specified level of profit 
from its operations during the first period to be able 
to repay his debt and to ensure survival into the 
second period. Therefore a probabilistic survival 
constraint is introduced. In the second period, the 
entrepreneur obtains an additional loan to continue 
production. In their model, [19] showed that 
entrepreneurs can respond to bankruptcy risk by 
creating an operational hedge with its production 
decisions. For instance, he may produce less than the 
monopoly quantity in the first period to avoid 
bankruptcy (underproduction). 
      The models are maturity based: the entrepreneur 
pays to investors after a certain time period, and after 
both periods he has no obligations anymore, no 
matter how much has been paid. However, also 
income-based models are possible, in which the 
entrepreneur pays back to investors up to a particular 
amount. Nevertheless, those alternatives are not 
considered in this research.  
      Our results provide model-based guidelines for 
the financial repayment structure of a crowdfunding 
platform. The effect of the following variables is 
studied:  market size,  interest rate,  percentage 
profit/revenues paid, /  threshold after which 
entrepreneur starts paying.  
 
3.1. Mathematical Model 
 
As stated earlier, we build on a model developed 
by [19]. We start from their two period model with 
stochastic demand, and we aim to formulate a model 
that can be used to find the optimal production 
quantity  that maximizes profit  for the 
entrepreneur in the debt case.  
      If the entrepreneur chooses for a bank loan, it is 
assumed that he gets as much money from the bank 
as he needs. In the first period, , the 
entrepreneur starts running his business. By the end 
of the first period, the entrepreneur makes debt 
payments. If the entrepreneur made sufficient 
revenues to pay back debt plus an interest rate, he 
proceeds to the second period, .  
      At the beginning of each period, the entrepreneur 
determines what quantity  he will produce, 
according to his forecasted demand and the 
production costs per unit . Subsequently, the 
entrepreneur receives the amount  required for 
production from the bank. The price of the product is 
defined by a linear inverse demand function: 
 in which  represents the 
market size (Varian, 2010). To incorporate the 
implications of stochastic demand in the model, a 
demand shock  is introduced in each period . The 
random variable  is described by a normally 
distributed probability density function , with 
mean  and variance , and cumulative distribution 
function . The demand shocks occur by the end 
of each time period. The revenues made after each 
period are described by  
 
As a result, profit in period , given by , can be 
calculated: 
 
Assumption 4.1: Debt is issued at a constant interest 
rate and upon fully paying its previous debt the 
entrepreneur can borrow again in the second period 
to cover its production cost. 
      Then, the entrepreneur makes debt payments; he 
pays off the debt with positive interest rate . Hence, 
the costs of a bank loan for the entrepreneur are given 
by  in time period .  
As a result, profit in period , given by , can be 
calculated: 
 
Assumption 4.2: The entrepreneur goes bankrupt 
and gets liquidated unless he pays debt and interest 
at the end of each period. 
      The entrepreneur must generate a pre-specified 
level of profit from its operations during the first 
period to ensure survival into the second period. 
Therefore a probabilistic survival constraint is 
introduced: the entrepreneur only survives the first 
period if . If the entrepreneur defaults, he 
goes bankrupt and gets liquidated [16].  
      According to [19], entrepreneurs can respond to 
the bankruptcy risk, which is caused by demand 
uncertainty and the probabilistic survival constraint, 
by creating an operational hedge with its production 
decisions. Here, operational hedging is defined as 
employing operational activities to mitigate risk 
exposure and reduce disadvantageous risk. 
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      As a result, the value function  for the 
entrepreneur can be expressed as follows: 
 
      The stochastic survival constraint indicates that 
the firm will go to the second period only if the firm 
survives the first period ( . The value of 
 is assumed to be non-positive. However, it is not 
necessarily zero as it depends on the assets of the 
firm. 
      There are two scenarios that might occur. First, 
the entrepreneur may not be able to repay the entire 
debt; the default scenario. In the second scenario, the 
entrepreneur makes enough profit to survive the first 
period and make debt payments; the survival 
scenario. Two boundaries are defined that ascertain 
the threshold in which scenario  ends up.  
Proposition 4.1: the entrepreneur survives the first 
period if 
 
      Moreover the boundary  for which the 
venture survives the first period is obtained by setting 
. If 
 the entrepreneur survives the first period and 
he makes profit in both the first and the second 
period.  
Given the normally distributed probability function, 
the boundary that defines the scenarios can be 
distinguished as illustrated in figure 2. An example is 
considered of the probability density function with 
 and , to investigate the boundaries. The 
figure illustrates an example for  with 
, , , . The area on the left 
of the red boundary  applies to the bankruptcy 
scenario: the entrepreneur does not survive the first 
period and he is not able to pay back full debt. The 
area below  on the right of  applies to the 
second scenario: . In this scenario, the 
entrepreneur survives the first period. 
 
Figure 1 Probability density function and 
boundary 
      By solving the two period model, we aim to 
identify the optimal production quantity that the 
entrepreneur will produce, based on maximizing 
expected profit. The problem can be solved by 
backwards induction, and therefore the second stage 
problem should be solved first. Consequentially, the 
solution for the second period can be filled out in the 
value function . Since there is assumed to be no 
competition in this situation, , where 
 is the monopoly quantity.  
Proposition 4.2: The optimal production level in the 
second period  in the debt case is equal to the 
monopoly quantity . The optimal profit 
in the second period is given by 
. 
The optimal production quantity is found by setting 
. Substituting the optimal second 
period solution into the profit function results in the 
optimal profit. As a result, the value function for the 
entrepreneur  may also be written as:  
 
This equation is not easily algebraically solved while 
considering a normal distributed probability density 
function. However, when assuming a uniformly 
distributed probability density function, it is solvable. 
Under a normally distributed probability density we 
resort to numerical analysis.  
      In essence, this study has made a first start at 
modeling the various crowdfunding models that are 
available to subdivide the benefits of a crowdfunded 
venture between entrepreneur and investors. The 
results from this study consist on the one hand of a 
quantitative framework, which evaluates the 
 
          s.t.    
where   
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consequences of various crowdfunding models and 
several relevant market parameters for the 
entrepreneur. On the other hand, the results provide 
model-based guidelines for the financial repayment 
structure of a crowdfunding platform.  
      The evaluation of the debt model has showed that 
increased bankruptcy risk causes the entrepreneur to 
adopt a conservative operating policy to protect 
against bankruptcy risk in the first time period. This 
is in line with the findings of [19] and [15]. This 
operational hedge against bankruptcy risk does not 
lead to incentive problems between investor and 
entrepreneur. For the provider of the loan, survival of 





      This study provides important information for 
both academics and practitioners. It is valuable for 
operations management and management information 
systems literature, because this study considers the 
influence of capital structure in a crowdfunding 
environment on the operational decisions of a 
wearable technology firm. The results confirm 
findings of authors like [19] and [15], who 
investigate production decisions in a debt 
environment under demand uncertainty and market 
imperfections. Besides, this research is a valuable 
contribution to literature that is available about 
crowdfunding. 
      Besides, the mathematical framework that has 
been developed is a useful tool that can be used by 
practitioners in wearable technology business. The 
models can be used for setting parameters that fix the 
payoff structure for individual entrepreneurs. In 
addition, the framework can be used for comparing 
the financial structures with each other and for 
determining the expected profit for a particular 
entrepreneur who desires to obtain funding by 
crowdfunding. However, increasing the practical 
applicability of the models contributes to increasing 
the value for practitioners.   
      This research has been conducted at ABN AMRO 
Bank N.V., which currently is developing an online 
crowdfunding platform that may be used by 
entrepreneur to finance new ventures. The platform 
needs to decide what financial model to adopt for 
paying back investors, and this choice has led to the 
direction of this research. Namely, feasible design of 
that financial model has been recognized as of main 
importance to keep the stakeholders (i.e. entrepreneur 
and investors) involved in the long term. 
      The main goal of this research has been defined 
as developing a quantitative framework to understand 
and evaluate the implications of various 
crowdfunding models for the entrepreneur and 
investors and to provide model-based guidelines. For 
future research, we believe that it is a fruitful 
direction to explore models that optimize the interest 
rate and the bankruptcy thresholds. 
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